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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
While each of the parties have previously set forth the 
statement of the case in their earlier briefs, Golden Meadows 
and Crowleys are compelled to correct the purposeful omissions 
and misrepresentations contained in Coons' Statement of the 
Case in Brief of Appellees. 
In February, 1994, Coons was in the midst of constructing 
the home in question and was advertising it for sale. At the 
time Mrs. Crowley entered into the Real Estate Purchase 
Contract, the home was far from being completed. Her 
agreement to purchase the home was contingent upon Coons first 
completing the home as the parties had agreed. This he never 
did. Several of the upgrades about which Coons complains were 
upgrades which he agreed would be included in the agreed upon 
purchase. It is a misrepresentation of the facts for Coonses 
to state that the upgrades desired by Mrs. Crowley were over 
and above what was agreed on between the parties. This was 
the precise issue at the heart of the dispute between the 
parties as to which upgrades were to have been reasonably 
included in the purchase price and which ones were not. 
By July, 1994, Coons was in a desperate situation. He 
had run out of money and could not complete construction of 
the home without additional cash and the construction loan was 
due. It was at this time that he approached the Crowleys to 
see if they would close on the unfinished home, if he promised 
to complete construction after closing when he would receive 
the sales proceeds. By this time Mrs. Crowley had already 
spent tens of thousands of dollars on the home, in addition to 
the purchase price, paying Coons' subcontractors, paying for 
various items of materials used in the construction of the 
home, and even paying for upgrades that Coons had promised to 
pay for, not to mention the upgrades that were over and above 
her contract with Mr. Coons. Crowleys told Coons that when he 
finished construction of their home as agreed that they would 
close. He never completed construction as agreed resulting in 
the Crowleys refusing to close. 
In July, 1994, when Crowleys refused to close on their 
partially finished home, and further refused to advance any 
more funds to Coons, Coons walked off the job claiming breach. 
Construction on the home was never completed by Coons and the 
inspections he refers to in his statement of facts were rough 
inspections only, not final inspections. It is simply untrue 
that Mr. Coons had scheduled all required work on the house 
and then canceled it when the Crowleys refused to close. It 
is also untrue that Coons had to renegotiate the terms of his 
construction with Zions Mortgage because Mrs. Crowley refused 
to close. By July, 1994, Coons had successfully obtained four 
(4) separate extensions of his construction loan from Zions 
Mortgage Company, despite the fact that he had never made a 
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payment on the loan. Coons did not obtain any further 
extensions of his construction loan after July 18, 1994, after 
Crowleys refused to close on their partially completed home, 
contrary to his statement of the case. Thereafter, the loan 
went into default. Again, the point must be emphasized that 
throughout this entire matter, Coons never made a single 
payment on the construction loan for money he borrowed to 
build this home. 
Coons is critical of the fact that Golden Meadows 
purchased the construction loan from Zions Mortgage Company. 
In fact he has even gone so far as to allege that Golden 
Meadows and Michael Crowley are one in the same, or that one 
is the alter ego of the other. That is simply not true. They 
are two separate and distinct legal entities, even though Mr. 
Crowley is the president of Golden Meadows. Mr. Coons 
conveniently omits the fact that Golden Meadows was forced to 
purchase the construction loan from Zions Mortgage to protect 
the significant sums of money that had been invested in the 
home by Golden Meadows and Mrs. Crowley, due to Coonses' 
threats and attempts to sell the home to a third party. 
Golden Meadows engaged in no wrongful conduct in purchasing 
the construction loan and in fact paid Zions Mortgage nearly 
$177,000.00 for said note. Golden Meadows would have 
preferred not to pay out nearly $177,000 in cash for the 
construction note to protect the interests of Mrs. Crowley and 
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itself. However, Coons' wrongful conduct left them no 
alternative. Coons also conveniently fails to tell the Court 
that on the date that Golden Meadows delivered its money to 
Zions Mortgage for the construction loan that Coons was 
already in default on the note. Remember, Coons never made a 
single payment on the construction loan. Contrary to his 
assertions, Coons never tendered or delivered to Golden 
Meadows the full amount due under the terms and conditions of 
the Construction Loan Agreement and Trust Deed Note to cure 
his default. For him to say otherwise is a purposeful 
misstatement of the truth. 
Mr. Coons operated without a contractor's license, in 
violation of the law, for more than 14 months. He knew very 
well that he had not paid the required registration fee, but 
took no action to cure this defect, until he was caught and 
pleaded guilty in late 1994. 
The Coonses continue to mislead this Court by 
misrepresenting the Arbitration Award. It was Coonses who 
sued Mrs. Crowley for breach of contract for refusing to 
close, which claims Mrs. Crowley defended. In response 
thereto, the arbitrator found that "failure to close the 
sale...did not constitute a breach of the contract." There is 
no finding in the Arbitration Award that "Neither party had 
breached the Real Estate Contract" as the Coonses allege. 
A further misrepresentation by Coonses is the claim that 
-4-
the arbitrator gave both parties "specific direction how to 
resolve the matter by having the work completed on the home by 
Mr. Coons and Mr. and Mrs. Crowley closing on the home within 
thirty days". Coons conveniently omits the fact that despite 
this directive by the arbitrator, Coons refused to complete 
construction on the home and went so far as to cutting off the 
power to the home in an attempt to prevent Crowleys from 
completing construction on the home without him. The 
undeniable truth is that Coons never completed construction on 
the home and by virtue of the contract which he entered into 
with Mrs. Crowley was never entitled to any payment. The 
final paragraph of Coons' statement of facts is a prime 
example of how the arbitrator, exceeded his powers by refusing 
to award Golden Meadows its late charges and interest. 
Coons' statement of the case is a purposeful attempt to 
mislead this court through omitting and misstating the true 
facts in this case, which conduct should be sanctioned. 
Having demonstrated that his entire version of the facts is 
misleading or false, suffice it to say that the Court should 
rely upon Golden Meadows' and Crowleys statement of the case. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Arbitration Award and Supplement to Arbitration Award 
must be vacated because the arbitrator exceeded his powers and 
-5-
failed to follow the law. It does not matter that the 
arbitrator was the former chief justice of the Utah Supreme 
Court. What matters is that the legal standards and 
principles that govern the resolutions of disputes in this 
state apply equally across the board to tribunals, courts of 
law, arbitration proceedings and other forms of dispute 
resolution. None of Coonses' arguments in support of the 
Arbitration Award and Supplement to Arbitration Award are 
persuasive, and they factual his is mostly a one-sided version 
laced with half truths, innuendos, misrepresentations and out 
right lies. 
This Court has the opportunity to correct a fundamental 
injustice in our arbitration procedure, under various legal 
theories. Failure to do so will compromise and jeopardize the 
future of alternative dispute resolution in this state. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
THE ARBITRATION AWARD AND THE SUPPLEMENT TO ARBITRATION AWARD 
MUST BE VACATED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
A. This Court must not be unduly influenced by virtue of who 
the arbitrator was 
It is no secret that the parties to this matter agreed on 
an arbitrator, selecting Gordon R. Hall, retired chief justice 
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of the Utah Supreme Court. Golden Meadows, Crowleys and their 
counsel respect Mr. Hall and give him due deference for his 
past accomplishments on the bench. Nevertheless, they submit 
that when he agreed to act as an arbitrator in this matter, he 
also agreed to be bound by the governing laws. Golden Meadows 
and Crowleys submit that ample evidence exists demonstrating 
that the arbitrator did not follow the law or apply the 
correct legal standards. 
Rather than substantively examine the arbitration 
proceeding and resulting awards, Coons focuses this Courts 
attention on the identity of the arbitrator. Coons' brief in 
this matter is just under seventeen (17) full pages from 
beginning to end. Within those seventeen (17) pages, Coonses 
made 31 references to the arbitrator, Gordon Hall, in one form 
or another. In every instance their reference to him was 
preceded with the title "the honorable", "judge" or "former 
chief justice". Several pages of Coons' Brief make multiple 
references to the arbitrator with page 7 containing seven (7) 
such references. 
Rather than succinctly and substantively addressing the 
merits of this action, Coonses have engaged in a blatant 
attempt to cloud the issues and this Court's independent 
judgment through constant reminder of who the.arbitrator was, 
thereby attempting to improperly influence this Court to 
affirm the Arbitration Award simply because of who served as 
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the arbitrator. Anyone who has known or associated with Gordon 
R. Hall likes him. He is a warm, pleasant and personable 
individual who is enjoyable to be around. Nevertheless, 
Golden Meadows and Crowley submit that, with all due respect 
to former Chief Justice Hall, his personality characteristics, 
past accomplishments and years of service, his former position 
has absolutely nothing to do with this matter. What is at 
issue is whether his arbitration ruling is consistent with the 
very laws that he helped fashion and develop. In this regard, 
Golden Meadows and Crowleys respectfully submit that his 
Arbitration Award and Supplement to Arbitration Award fly in 
the face of long established legal principles and must be 
vacated. 
Golden Meadows and Crowleys believe that this Court is 
capable of examining the merits of this matter, without regard 
to the identity of the arbitrator and independent of our 
personal feelings of fondness, admiration and respect which we 
all have for him. 
B. Equity is not available to rewrite Golden Meadows7 and 
Crowley's Contracts with the Coonses 
It is undisputed that the arbitrator attempted to do 
equity in rendering his decision. It is further undisputed 
that the arbitrator failed, for whatever reason, to apply 
applicable law in fashioning his Arbitration Award and 
Supplement to Arbitration Award. It is a fundamental rule 
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that equity cannot be invoked to change rights defined and 
established by law, or in this case by contract, or to create 
.a right which otherwise does not exist. See, First State Bank 
& Trust Co. of Shawnee v. Wholesale Enterprises, Inc., 883 
P.2d 207 (Okl. App. 1994). 
Neither Golden Meadows nor Crowleys submitted to the 
arbitrator their various contracts with the Coonses for the 
arbitrator to construe or interpret the language thereof. 
Rather, Golden Meadows and Crowleys presented to the 
arbitrator their respective contracts with the Coonses for 
enforcement of the terms thereof. Golden Meadows and Crowleys 
did not bargain for or agree to have the arbitrator interpret, 
construe or rewrite their respective contracts with the 
Coonses. They cannot be forced to arbitrate the construction, 
interpretation and meaning of their respective contracts with 
Coonses, and the arbitrator in doing so exceeded his powers 
under the arbitration act. See, Western Employers Ins. Co. v. 
Jefferies & Co., 958 F.2d (9th Cir. 1992). 
The arbitrator, in seeking equity, exceeded his 
powers by failing to apply equity within the proper bounds of 
the law. As a general rule, equity is not available to 
reinstate rights and privileges voluntarily contracted away. 
Thornblad v. Thornblad, 849 P.2d 1197 (Ut. App. 1993); Hill v. 
Hill, 841 P.2d 772 (Ut. App. 1992). Simply put, a court, or 
an arbitrator, in equity will not assist one in extricating 
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himself from the circumstances which he has created, either by 
action or by contract. See, Willard Pease Oil v. Pioneer Oil 
& Gas Co, 899 P.2d 766, 772 (Utah 1995). While a court, or an 
arbitrator, sitting in equity exercises discretion in granting 
or denying relief, it does not have authority to ignore 
existing principles of law in favor of its own view of the 
equities. Warner v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 666 (Ut. App. 1992). 
This is preciously what was done by the arbitrator in this 
action. With the best of intentions, the arbitrator ignored 
the plain, clear and unambiguous language of Golden Meadows7 
and Crowley's respective contracts with the Coonses in favor 
of what he concluded to be an "equitable" result. This he 
cannot do. Golden Meadows and Crowleys submit that an 
arbitrator is, or should be, governed by the same legal 
principles and guidelines that laws that govern a court of 
law. A court of equity cannot make a contract which it thinks 
the parties can agree to, it can only enforce the existing 
agreement, Genest v. John Glenn Corp. , 696 P.2d 1058 (Or. 
1985). Likewise arbitrators are or should be governed by the 
same legal principles. Inter-City Gas Corp. v. Boise Cascade 
Corp., 845 P.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1988) (although an arbitrator may 
interpret ambiguous language of a contract, the arbitrator may 
not disregard or modify unambiguous contract provisions); 
Coast Trading Co. v. Pacific Molasses Co. , 681 F.2d 1195 (9th 
Cir. 1982)(where the arbitrators exceeded the authority given 
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them by consent of the parties by arbitrarily extending the 
contract delivery date, the arbitration award is invalid). 
In the instant action, the arbitrator ignored: 1) the 
plain and unambiguous contract provisions which award costs 
and attorney's fees to Mrs- Crowley and interest, late fees, 
penalties, costs and attorney's fees to Golden Meadows; and 2) 
the statue which precluded Mr. Coons from bringing the instant 
action or obtaining any recovery thereunder in the first 
place. This Court would not hesitate to reverse these errors 
of law on appeal from a lower court. No reason exists why 
this Court should take a different approach from an 
arbitration proceeding. 
All that Golden Meadows and Mrs. Crowley are seeking is 
a determination by this Court that the same legal principles 
that govern legal proceedings will also govern arbitration 
proceedings, and then have this Court enforce those 
principles. To do otherwise is to establish "arbitrary" not 
arbitration proceedings which violate public policy and trust 
and erode the use and effectiveness of arbitration and 
alternative dispute resolution proceedings in this state. 
Federal courts have never limited their scope of review of 
arbitration awards to a strict reading of 9 U.S.C. §10 but 
rather have traditionally subjected arbitration awards to sort 
of an "abuse of discretion" standard, viewed either as 
inherent appurtenance to a right of judicial review or as a 
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broad interpretation of § 10(d) prohibiting arbitrators from 
exceeding their powers. Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Secur., 
Inc. , 847 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1998). This Court should do 
likewise 
C. A clear and unambiguous contract must be enforced 
Since the rules for construction of contracts are 
essentially the same in law and equity, 17A Am. Jur. 2d 
Contracts §336 (1993), a review of those rules would be 
instructive in this matter. It is a basic rule of contract 
law that a court cannot and will not rewrite an unambiguous 
contract to make it more "equitable". See, Provo City Corp. 
v. Nielsen Scott Co., Ins., 603 P.2d 8034 (Utah 1979); 17A Am. 
Jur. 2d Contracts §§ 340, 341 (1993) . When the meaning of a 
contract is clear and unambiguous, it is to be interpreted as 
a matter of law. Willard Pease Oil v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co. , 
899 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1995); 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 340 
(1993). Where the language of a contract is clear and 
unambiguous, as it is in the instant action, it is the duty of 
the court to enforce the contract as made by the parties. 
Ryan v. Board of County Com'rs for Gallatin County, 620 P.2d 
1203 (Mont. 1980); 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 337 (1993). 
Golden Meadows and Crowley submit that these rules of 
construction apply not only to judges and courts but also to 
arbitrators and alternative dispute resolution proceedings. 
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D. Mrs, Crowley is entitled to an award of costs and 
attorney's fees 
The Coonses commenced this action against Mrs, Crowley by 
filing a complaint against her wherein they alleged that she 
was in breach or default of the terms of the Real Estate 
Purchase Contract by refusing to close when demanded to do so 
by Coonses. As a result of Coons7 unilateral demands to for 
Mrs, Crowley to close on the home in question prior to its 
completion, Mrs. Crowley incurred various costs and was forced 
to retain counsel to defend her Coons' outrageous demands. 
The arbitrator specifically found in the Arbitration Award 
that: "[T]he failure to close the sale on April 15, 1994, did 
not constitute a breach of the contract since such was not a 
firm date as is evidenced by the February 3, 1994, addendum". 
(emphasis added) Mrs. Crowley successful defended against the 
Coons' claims that she had breached the Real Estate Purchase 
Contract by refusing to close. Paragraph 17 of the Real 
Estate Purchase Contract states "ATTORNEY'S FEES. In any 
action arising out of this Contract, the prevailing party 
shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney's fees." 
It is undisputed that Mrs. Crowley was the prevailing party on 
the issue of whether or not she breached the Real Estate 
Purchase Contract. Nevertheless, in fashioning what the 
arbitrator deemed to be an "equitable" remedy, the arbitrator 
exceeded his powers in failing to enforce the attorney's fee 
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provision of the parties' contract, and in failing to award 
Mrs. Crowley her costs and attorney's fees, thus making the 
arbitration award invalid. 
E. Golden Meadows is entitled to an award of interest, late 
fees, penalties, costs and attorney's fees 
Golden Meadows purchased from Zions Mortgage Company for 
valid consideration, Coons' construction loan, resulting in 
Zions Mortgage Company assigning its interest in the 
Construction Loan Agreement, Trust deed Note and Trust Deed to 
Golden Meadows. It is undisputed that as of August 15, 1994, 
Coonses were in default of the terms and conditions of the 
Construction Loan Agreement and Trust Deed Note. In the 
Arbitration Award the arbitrator specifically found that 
fl[G]olden Meadows, Inc. is the successor-in-interest in and to 
the Construction Loan, Trust Deed, and Deed of Trust, having 
acquired the same on August 15, 1994, by assignment from Zions 
Mortgage Company for the recited consideration of 
$176,916.64." Nevertheless, the arbitrator failed to award 
Golden Meadows its interest, penalties, late fees, costs and 
attorney's fees as provided by the Construction Loan 
Agreement, Trusteed Deed Not and/or Trust Deed, opting instead 
for a more "equitable" result. This action of the arbitrator 
invalidates his award. 
F. Coons is entitled to no award whatsoever 
Coons was not a licensed contractor during the relevant 
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period of time at question herein. Utah Code Ann. §58-55-604 
precludes all contractors from commencing or maintaining any 
action for collection or compensation without alleging and 
proving that the contractor was "properly licensed when the 
contract sued upon was entered into and when the alleged cause 
of action arose". Coons fails on both accounts. Instead of 
disposing of this matter in short order pursuant to state law, 
the arbitrator, arbitrarily ruled that Coons did not need a 
license since he was an "owner and built the house on 
speculation for his own occupancy". While that may have been 
true at one point in time, he waived that position by agreeing 
to build the house for Mrs. Crowley. The day he signed the 
Real Estate Purchase Contract with Mrs. Crowley whereby he 
agreed to sell Mrs. Crowley the home upon completion of its 
construction, he ceased building that home either on 
speculation or for his own occupancy. Even though Mr. Coons 
knew that his contract's license had not been renewed, and was 
suspended he nevertheless proceeded forward in performing 
construction work for Mrs. Crowley. Mr. Coons knew the 
penalty for engaging in construction without a license was his 
inability to commence or maintain an action for collection or 
compensation and still he proceeded forward with construction 
on Crowleys' home. The arbitrator completely ignored the 
applicable law on this issue in the name of equity. In order 
to fashion what the arbitrator deemed to be a more "equitable" 
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result, he failed to apply governing legal principles. That 
act invalidates the arbitration Award and Supplement to 
Arbitration Award. 
POINT II 
PUBLIC POLICY DEMANDS THAT ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS BE 
GOVERNED BY THE SAME LEGAL STANDARDS AS 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
Golden Meadows and Crowley agree that arbitration is 
intended to be speedier and less expensive, with less 
attendant litigation, than a regular court proceeding. It was 
for those reasons that they agreed to arbitrate. However, 
Golden Meadows and Crowley were under the impression that the 
same legal principles and standards applied to all legal 
proceedings in Utah, whether traditional court proceedings, 
arbitration proceedings or other forms of alternative dispute 
resolution proceedings. Furthermore, Golden Meadows and 
Crowley were under the impression, when they agreed to 
arbitrate this matter, that the arbitrator was required to 
follow the law and if he did not, that the Court had power to 
vacate his decision. 
It is undisputed that the arbitrator fashioned an 
"equitable" remedy in complete abrogation of the law. Had a 
court so exceeded its powers it would have been reversible 
error. Golden Meadows and Crowleys submit that the same legal 
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standards and principles that govern actions before a court 
should also govern actions before an arbitrator. Golden 
Meadows and Crowley have suggested alternative legal theories 
upon which this Court may rely in so adopting a plain, 
consistent and clear standard for all legal actions in this 
state. Golden Meadows and Crowleys submit that for this Court 
so to do would not unnecessarily expand its review or 
associated litigation. In fact, by adhering to the same clear 
and consistent legal standards for arbitration proceedings as 
well as court proceedings, the law would be more certain, this 
Court's review defined and limited, and less litigation would 
follow. Furthermore the results would be more fair and 
equitable. 
Golden Meadows and Crowleys are well aware of the backlog 
of cases clogging courts in this and every other jurisdiction 
in this country. Golden Meadows and Crowley are proponents of 
alternative dispute resolution engaging in it in this action. 
However, for alternative dispute resolution, including 
arbitration, to be effective and to work, legal principles 
have to be consistently applied. If in opting for some form 
of alternative dispute resolution parties realize that they 
will not know until after.the award is entered just what legal 
principles governed the proceeding and then learn that 
regardless of the outcome, this Court will not correct 
manifest errors of law of the arbitrator, as it would any 
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judge, then the effectiveness of alternative dispute 
resolution is eliminated. 
No one in their right mind would knowingly choose such an 
arbitrary and capricious forum in which to attempt to resolve 
their disputes. Public policy and the future of alternative 
dispute resolution in this state requires this Court to once 
and for all to squarely face this issue, taking whatever 
action is necessary to insure that legal standards are 
consistently applied in all legal forums, whether in the 
formal setting of courtroom or in the informal setting of the 
conference room. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court has the power, authority and responsibility, 
to vacate the Arbitration Award and Supplement to Arbitration 
Award in this matter. Governing legal principles have to be 
applied equally to all forms of dispute resolution in this 
state. Public policy and the justice so demand. Because the 
arbitrator, exceeded his powers fashioning "equity" in 
complete abrogation of the law the awards must be vacated. 
Respectfully submitted this 4th day of September, 1996. 
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^T^tSfigt^: 
Day, Shell & Liljenquist 
Attori>eySt for Golden Meadows 
Larry L.^nyxe 
Attorney for Michael "and 
Debra Crowley 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 4th day of September, 1996, 
I served the foregoing by causing true and correct copies to 
be placed in the United States Mail, postage prepaid and 
addressed to Carvel R. Shaffer, 110 West Center, Bountiful, 
Utah 84010. 
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